Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets

Paul Belleflamme and Eric Toulemonde

No 2007039, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra-group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter-group externalities.

Keywords: two-sided markets; naked exclusion; divide and conquer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L13 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: NEGATIVE INTRA-GROUP EXTERNALITIES IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS (2009)
Working Paper: Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets (2009)
Working Paper: Negative Intra-Group Externalities in Two-Sided Markets (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2007039

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