The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the television news scheduling game

Jean Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel () and Michel Le Breton

No 2007070, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We characterize the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium of an extension of the "television news sheduling game" of Cancian, Bergstrom and Bills (1995) where viewers want to watch the first newscast broadcast after they return home. A fraction of the viewers record randomly one of the newscast to watch them in case they are too late. At equilibrium, neither of the two stations broadcasts its evening news in the first part of the evening and the density function is strictly decreasing.

Date: 2007-09-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2007.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: THE MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE TELEVISON NEWS SCHEDULING GAME (2008)
Working Paper: The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the television news scheduling game (2008)
Working Paper: The Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the Television News Scheduling Game (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2007070

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().