Shapley compensation scheme

Pierre Dehez ()

No 2007094, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and have a nonempty core. We characterize the core and compute thecompensation scheme derived from the Shapley value. We then compare it to the nucleolus.Although we use the term "data" our analysis actually applies to any good characterized bynon rivalry and excludability.

Keywords: cost sharing; Shapley value; nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D46 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2007.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2007094

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().