Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies

Juan Moreno-Ternero

No 2008015, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We study mechanisms to construct equal-opportunity policies for resource allocation. In our model agents enjoy welfare as a function of the effort they expend, and the amount of a socially provided resource they consume. Nevertheless, agents have interdependent allocations. As in the standard approach to equality of opportunity, the aim is to allocate the social resource so that welfare across individuals at the same relative effort level is as equal as possible. We show how pursuing this same aim while assuming that agents have interdependent preferences might crucially alter the results.

Keywords: equality of opportunity; interdependent preferences; social policies; compensation; responsibility. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H00 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2008.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies (2009)
Chapter: Interdependent preferences in the design of equal-opportunity policies (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().