Axiomatic resource allocation for heterogeneous agents

Juan Moreno-Ternero and John Roemer

No 2008018, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We analyze a model of resource allocation in which agents' abilities (to transform the resource into an interpersonally comparable outcome) and initial endowments may differ. We impose ethical and operational axioms in this model and characterize some allocation rules as a result of combining these axioms. Two focal (and polar) egalitarian rules are singled out. On the one hand, the rule that allocates the resource equally across agents. On the other hand, the rule tha allocates the resource so that the distribution of final outcomes is exicographically maximized.

Keywords: resource allocation; egalitarianism; priority; solidarity; composition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism (2012)
Working Paper: A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008018

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