Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

Marco Marinucci

No 2008023, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.

Keywords: joint ventures; strategic alliances; ownership structure; asymmetries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2009)
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2009)
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2008)
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2008)
Working Paper: Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners (2008)
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