The TV news scheduling game when the newcaster's face matters
Jean Gabszewicz,
Didier Laussel () and
Nathalie Sonnac
No 2008032, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Abstract:
The present note first provides an alternative formulation of the Cancian, Bills and Bergström (1995)- problem which discards the non-existence difficulty and consequently allows to consider some extensions of the TV-newscast scheduling game. The extension we consider consists in assuming that viewers'preferences between the competing channels do not depend only on the timing of their broadcast, but also on some other characteristics, like the content of the show or the identity of the newscaster. Then we identify a sufficient condition on the dispersion of these preferences over the viewers' population guaranteeing the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. It turns out that, at this equilibrium, both networks broadcast their news at the same instant.
Keywords: advertising; newspapers quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L15 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
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Working Paper: The TV news scheduling game when the newscaster’s face matters (2008) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2008032
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