How lotteries outperform auctions for charity

Olivier Bos

No 2009049, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among valuations with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.

Keywords: all-pay auctions; charity; complete information; lotteries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2009049

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