An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock

David de la Croix and Frédéric Docquier

No 2009053, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Keywords: public good; inequality aversion; immigration policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D58 D6 D7 F22 F55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mig and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock (2015)
Working Paper: An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill immigration deadlock (2014)
Working Paper: An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock (2010)
Working Paper: An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2009053

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