Announcement wars as an equilibrium selection device
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo (),
Andrew Hughes Hallett () and
Paolo Giovanni Piacquadio
No 2009077, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
This paper attempts to give a rationale to public announcements, so often observed in the real world, and to formalize the idea that they can be used as a form of equilibrium selection device when multiple equilibria arise. It also shows how announcements solve the problems of coordination failures as predicted by the empirical literature based on experimental studies
Keywords: multiple Nash equilibria; coordination failure; cheap talk; policy games; announcement equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2009077
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