Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

Hiroshi Uno ()
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Hiroshi Uno: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 2009080, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This note shows that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined in Uno (2007, Economics Bulletin 3 (17)) if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player

Keywords: Strategic complementarities; potential games; existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2009080

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