The stability of the roommate problem revisited

Elena Inarra, Conchi Larrea () and Elena Molis
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Conchi Larrea: University of the Basque Country, Dpto Economía Aplicada IV (Mathematics), E-48007 Bilbao, Spain

No 2010007, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The lack of stability in some matching problems suggests that alternative solution concepts to the core might be a step towards furthering our understanding of matching market performance. We propose absorbing sets as a solution for the class of roommate problems with strict preferences. This solution, which always exists, either gives the matchings in the core or predicts other matchings when the core is empty. Furthermore, it satisfies the interesting property of outer stability. We also determine the matchings in absorbing sets and find that in the case of multiple absorbing sets a similar structure is shared by all.

Keywords: roommate problem; core; absorbing sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010007

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