Experimental results on the roommate problem
Elena Molis () and
Róbert Veszteg ()
No 2010011, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, as their offering and accepting decisions are only guided by the objective of improving upon the status quo. However, isolated individual mistakes, that do not disappear with experience or time, often make theoretically-stable matchings unstable in the laboratory. Markets with incomplete infor- mation are especially prone to this problem.
Keywords: convergence; experiments; one-sided matching; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010011
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