Innovation, antidumping and retaliation
Kaz Miyagiwa (),
Huasheng Song and
Hylke Vandenbussche ()
No 2010064, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
We study the effect of contingency trade policy in a multi-country oligopoly model with and without R&D opportunities. We show that firms benefit from unilateral protection but initiate antidumping (AD) only against the targets domiciled in substantially smaller countries. Also, AD filings are more likely when firms face R&D opportunities. These results are consistent with recent empirical findings, namely, (1) actions are mostly between industrial and developing countries, (2) developing countries use AD to retaliate against industrial countries, and (3) AD is concentrated in R&D-intensive industries. Interestingly, intellectual property rights violations in developing countries have no connection to AD filings.
Keywords: R&D; antidumping; intellectual property rights; reciprocal dumping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-int, nep-ipr and nep-pr~
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Working Paper: Innovation, antidumping, and retaliation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010064
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