EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Lower bounds rule!

Roland Iwan Luttens ()
Additional contact information
Roland Iwan Luttens: Ghent University, SHERPPA, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 2010069, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We propose two axioms that introduce lower bounds into resource monotonicity requirements for rules for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims. Suppose the amount to divide increases. The first axiom requires that two claimants whose lower bound changes equally experience an equal change in awards. The second axiom requires that extra resources are divided only among those claimants who experience a strictly positive change in their lower bound. We show that, in the two-claimant case, Concede-and-Divide is the only rule that satisfies both axioms when the axioms are defined over a large set of lower bounds that include the minimal rights lower bound and the secured lower bound. We also show that, in the n-claimant case where at least one claimant claims the total amount, the Minimal Overlap rule is the only rule that satisfies both axioms when the axioms are defined over the secured lower bound.

Keywords: claims problems; lower bounds; concede-and-divide; minimal overlap rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-11-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2010.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010069

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2010069