EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Patent office governance and patent system quality

Pierre Picard () and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

No 2011018, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent offices that maximises either the social welfare or its own profit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management.

Keywords: patent system; quality; intellectual property; public firm organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L30 O30 O31 O34 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/core/documents/coredp2011_18web.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Patent office Governance and Patent System Quality (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2011018

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().

 
Page updated 2019-11-09
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2011018