Linear prices for non-convex electricity markets: models and algorithms
Mathieu van Vyve ()
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Mathieu van Vyve: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE and LSM, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
No 2011050, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Strict Linear Pricing in non-convex markets is a mathematical impossibility. In the context of electricity markets, two different classes of solutions have been proposed to this conundrum on both sides of the Atlantic. We formally describe these two approaches in a common framework, review and analyze their main properties, and discuss their shortcomings. In US, some orders are not settled at the market price, but at their bidding price, deviating from uniform pricing (all orders are financially settled at the same prices). This creates a disincentive to bid one's own true cost, and creates a missing money problem for the clearing house of the market. In Europe, all accepted orders are in-the-money are settled at the uniform market price. This implies that the welfare-maximizing solution is considered infeasible and also that the optimization problem is much less convex and more difficult to solve. This also creates fairness issues for orders of small volume, and the solution obtained does not implement a Walrasian equilibrium. Based on this analysis we propose a new model that draws on both approaches and retains their best theoretical properties. We also show how the different approaches compare on classical toy problem.
Keywords: electricity markets; non-convexities; pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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