Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities

Filippo Calciano ()

No 2011054, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of the theory of supermodular games in the context where individual decision variables take values in a totally ordered set to prove existence of equilibria in this generalized Cournot setting.

Keywords: Cournot oligopoly; complementarity; generalized modularity; generalized increasing differences; supermodular games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-21
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2011054

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