Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

Vladyslav Nora and Hiroshi Uno ()
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Hiroshi Uno: Graduate School of Economics, Osaka Prefecture University, Japan

No 2012050, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper introduces games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real valued function on the set of action profiles such that, for one player, minimizing the function implies choosing her best-response, and, for the other players, maximizing it implies choosing their best-responses. We provide a new sufficient condition for robustness to incomplete information of sets of equilibria in a sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, Econometrica), Morris and Ui (2005, J. of Econ. Theory) for games with a saddle function. Our result unifies and generalizes sufficient conditions for zero-sum and best-response potential games.

Keywords: incomplete information; robust equilibrium; potential games; zero-sum games; team-maximin equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12-10
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Journal Article: Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria (2014)
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