Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting

Sudipto Bhattacharya, Claude D’aspremont, (), Sergei Guriev and Debapriya Sen
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Claude D’aspremont,: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Claude d'Aspremont

No 2012055, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we review some of the literature on R&D collective arrangements using game theoretical concepts and considering various settings, involving either complete or incomplete contracts. Patent protection, licensing in various industry contexts as well as the role of various factors such as product differentiation, innovation magnitude and asymmetric information are considered. The relation of innovative activity to the intensity of competition is reconsidered and the benefit of various types of cooperative R&D-agreements in presence of externalities are reviewed. The last two sections are devoted to contracting issues.

Keywords: cost-reducing innovations; cooperative R&D-agreements; development efforts; incomplete contracting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 D45 L13 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-12-21
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Chapter: Cooperation in R&D: Patenting, Licensing, and Contracting (2014)
Working Paper: Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing, and contracting (2014)
Working Paper: Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting (2013)
Working Paper: Cooperation in R&D: patenting, licensing and contracting (2013)
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