Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph

Federico Grigis de Stefano
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Federico Grigis de Stefano: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium

No 2014015, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper introduces two set valued Nash equilibrium refinements that are a natural generalization of the concept of stable set of equilibria introduced in Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and satisfy all the properties defined in Mertens (1989). It also establishes a connection between Nash equilibrium refinements and stochastic games as a tool to define a stable set of equilibria.

Keywords: game theory; equilibrium refinements; strategic stability; stochastic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A23 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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