The Economics of Crowdfunding Platforms

Paul Belleflamme, Nessrine Omrani and Martin Peitz

No 2015015, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper provides a description of the crowdfunding sector, considering investment- based crowdfunding platforms as well as platforms in which funders do not obtain monetary payments. It lays out key features of this quickly developing sector and explores the economic forces at play that can explain the design of these platforms. In particular, it elaborates on cross-group and within-group external effects and asymmetric information on crowdfunding platforms.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; Platform markets; Network effects; Asymmetric information; P2P lending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 G24 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (164)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2015.html (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The economics of crowdfunding platforms (2015)
Working Paper: The economics of crowdfunding platforms (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2015015

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().