Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding

Paul Belleflamme

No 2015042, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology that allows it to identify a consumer's willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show in this note that consumers are collectively better off when this hiding technology is not available, even when consumers can acquire it free of charge.

Keywords: price discrimination; privacy; monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D18 L12 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mkt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding (2016)
Working Paper: Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: the hidden cost of hiding (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2015042

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