The Role of Capacity Building on Technology Adoption under Imperfect Competition

Thomas Fagart and N. Baris Vardar
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N. Baris Vardar: Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium

No 2016011, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This work studies the investment choice of firms in a two-period model when there are two different productive capacities that embody two different types of technology. One of them is more ender duopoly competition, there exists a symmetric equilibrium and two asymmetric equilibria with preemption, in which one of the firms overinvests in the ine

Keywords: capacity choice; technology adoption; financial constraint; market structure; symmetric and asymmetric equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D43 D92 L11 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-23
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2016011

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