Economics at your fingertips  

Merger Incentives Under Yardstick Competition: a Theoretical Model

Jonas Teusch ()
Additional contact information
Jonas Teusch: Université de Liège

No 2016037, CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Are the incentives for firms to merge horizontally under yardstick regulation actually aligned with social and consumer welfare? Natural monopoly operators regulated by yardstick competition, such as electric- ity network operators and water distribution utilities, have merged re- peatedly in recent years. In the context of regulated network industries, yardstick competition implies that firms compete on costs, given that their revenue allowance is based on cost observations from similar firms (peers). Whereas regulators have raised concerns about horizontal merg- ers under yardstick competition, traditional economic theory suggests that this restructuring should not lead to (unilateral) anticompetitive e ects. In our theoretical model, by contrast, firm incentives for horizontal merg- ers involving peers are only aligned with social and consumer welfare if efficiency gains are sufficiently large. We go on to show how regulators can better align firm incentives with welfare considerations and limit the need for costly merger control by adapting the yardstick regime to the domestic industry structure.

Keywords: Yardstick Competition; Merger Analysis; Utility Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L40 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
Date: 2016-10-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... df?a=true&guest=true (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CORE Discussion Papers from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().

Page updated 2019-04-20
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2016037