Public finances under plurality and proportional electoral systems. Evidence from Hungarian municipalities

Andras Gregor

No 2017029, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper I provide evidence on e ects of plurality and proportional electoral systems on fiscal outcomes. In Hungary di erent voting regimes are applied to elect the members of local councils: in places where more than 10,000 people live a variant of

Keywords: public finances; plurality vs. proportional system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-pol, nep-pub and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2017029

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