Screening procrastinators with automatiic-renewal contracts

Johannes Johnen

No 2017030, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Automatic contract renewals are a common feature in consumer markets and a frequent concern among policy makers. They can be used to exploit consumer inertia when consumers forgo benefits from switching to better alternatives. I consider two sources for th

Keywords: Limited Attention; Automatic Contract Renewal; Price Discrimination; Present Bias; Naiveté (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D18 D41 D42 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2017030

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