Alternative representation of semivalues, the inverse problem and coalitional rationality

Irinel, Dragan () and Pierre Dehez ()
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Irinel, Dragan: University of Texas

No 2019010, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: The concept of semivalue of a transferable utility game has been introduced by Dubey, Neyman and Weber as weighted sum of marginal contributions. Later, Puente has introduced a particular class of semivalues, called binomial semivalues, where weights are obtained through a recursive procedure. In the present paper, we extend Puente's procedure to obtain an equivalent representation of semivalues that turns out to be useful to solve the inverse problem and the question of coalitional rationality.

Keywords: transferable utility games; semivalues; inverse problem; power game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-upt
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Working Paper: Alternative representation of semivalues, the inverse problem and coalitional rationality (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2019010

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