The competitive impacts of exclusivity and price transparency in markets with digital platforms
Paul Belleflamme and
No 2019019, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Two-sided digital platforms not only decide about the price structure, but often have non-price instruments at their disposal. Our objective in this article is to review recent work that aims at better understanding the possible pro- or anti-competitive effects of two specific non-price strategies: exclusivity as the contractual obligation to singlehome and price transparency as the disclosure of information about otherwise unobserved prices paid by users on the other side. Regarding the incentives that platforms may have to restrict users from visiting more than one platform at a time, one finding is that when platforms find it profitable to impose exclusivity on one side, users on the other side always suffer. Regarding price transparency in situations in which users on one side may not observe the prices that platforms set on the other side, we find that a monopoly platform is willing to remedy this problem by being transparent about all prices, whereas competing platform would in general prefer more opaqueness. From our findings we derive lessons for competition authorities.
JEL-codes: H20 H31 H50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-pay
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: The competitive impacts of exclusivity and price transparency in markets with digital platforms (2020)
Working Paper: The Competitive Impacts of Exclusivity and Price Transparency in Markets With Digital Platforms (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2019019
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().