Coalition-proof stable networks

Chenghong, Luo (), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Chenghong, Luo: CORE, UCLouvain and Ca’Foscoari University

No 2020018, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We propose the notion of coalition-proof stability for predicting the networks that could emerge when group deviations are allowed. A network is coalition-proof stable if there exists no coalition which has a credible group deviation. A coalition is said to have a credible group deviation if there is a profitable group deviation to some network and there is no subcoalition of the deviating players which has a subsequent credible group deviation. Coalition-proof stability is ai coarsening of sotrong stability. There is no relationship between the set of coalition-proof stable networks and the set of networks induced by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of Myerson’s linking game. Contrary to coalition-proof stability, coalition-proof Nash equilibria of Myerson’s linking game tend to support unreasonable networks.

Keywords: friendship networks; stable sets; myopic and farsighted players; assimilation; segregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C70 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-02-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
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Related works:
Journal Article: Coalition-proof stable networks (2022)
Working Paper: Coalition-proof stable networks (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2020018

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