Sharing a collective probability of success

Pierre Dehez ()

No 2020035, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: How to allocate the probability of success resulting from the joint actions of a group of players? To address this question, Hou et al. (Operations Research Letters 46, 2018) propose to use the Shapley value of a transferable utility game, a "probability game" assuming probabilistic independence. The purpose of the present note is to analyze the properties of probability games and their duals and to study various solution concepts, in particular the core and the Shapley value. We give an axiomatic foundation of the Shapley value on the class of probability games and we investigate the link between different solution concepts, including asymmetric values.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Journal Article: Sharing a collective probability of success (2023)
Working Paper: Sharing a collective probability of success (2023)
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