Dividing the expected payoff resulting from joint actions

Pierre Dehez ()

No 2023017, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider situations where players hit targets with known probabilities and are rewarded according to given rules. The division of the expected payoff resulting from their joint actions is studied in the context of transferable utility games, using the Shapley value as the allocation rule.

Keywords: Probability games; product games; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 2023-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dividing the expected payoff resulting from joint actions (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2023017

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