When Money Can ’t Buy Political Love: Lab Experiments on Vote Buying in Ghana and Uganda

Dominic Burbidge, Nic Cheeseman and Amma Panin ()
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Dominic Burbidge: University of Oxford
Nic Cheeseman: University of Birmingham
Amma Panin: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 2025005, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Reciprocity lies at the heart of vote buying but its exact role is nuanced. Politicians often offer money in exchange for votes. Yet citizens who reject bribery in the context of democratic political processes might view the exchange of money for votes as illegitimate, even if they enjoy reciprocal relationships with similar figures in other contexts. We test for the willingness of individuals to accept or reject electoral bribes using lab-in-the-field experiments in Ghana and Uganda. Participants play the roles of voters and candidates. Some candidates can offer a bribe before the vote. Voters are 14 percentage points more likely to vote for a candidate who had the opportunity to bribe but refrained from doing so. Cross-nationally, we draw on unique survey data that demonstrates respondents are more likely to reward non-bribing candidates in Ghana where there is a higher quality of democracy and stronger support for democratic norms and values. Individually, we find that voters who have had positive experiences and attitudes towards elections were more likely to vote for a candidate who did not bribe them. Taken together, these findings suggest that the lab-in-the-field results are best explained by the prevalence of democratic values among some respondents.

Keywords: Elections; Vote-buying; Bribery; Lab-in-the-field experiment; Ghana; Uganda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30
Date: 2025-03-01
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