School Choice with Unobservable Matchings

Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

No 2025007, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider priority-based school choice problems where students can form two types of matches: public matches observed by everyone and private matches generally not observed by others. We introduce the notion of rationalizable conjectural stable (RCS) matching, which generalizes Gale and Shapley (1962)’s stability notion to accommodate private matches. We partially characterize RCS matchings and we show that the Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance (EADA) matching is RCS when private and public matches are perfect substitutes. Finally, we extend the definition of RCS matching to school choice problems when private and public matches are imperfect substitutes.

Keywords: School choice; Private information; Private matchings; Stability; Rationalizability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31
Date: 2025-03-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://dial.uclouvain.be/pr/boreal/en/object/bore ... tastream/PDF_01/view (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2025007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().