Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences

David Spector

CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) from CEPREMAP

Abstract: This paper addresses the effect of horizontal mergers on prices. It is shown that if firms compete in quantities and marginal costs are nondecreasing, any profitable merger failing to generate technological synergies must harm consumers through higher prices, irrespective of entry conditions in the industry. However this result does not hold if products are differentiated and firms compete in prices. The implications for merger policy are discussed.

JEL-codes: D43 K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Horizontal mergers, entry, and efficiency defences (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:cepmap:0206

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