On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) from CEPREMAP
Pages: 39 pages
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Journal Article: On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection (1987)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8602
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