EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk-neutral agent

Roger Guesnerie (), Pierre Picard and Patrick Rey ()

CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) from CEPREMAP

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co8624.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents (1989) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8624

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) from CEPREMAP Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stéphane Adjemian ().

 
Page updated 2019-04-20
Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8624