Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk-neutral agent
Roger Guesnerie (),
Pierre Picard and
Patrick Rey ()
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) from CEPREMAP
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Journal Article: Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents (1989)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:cepmap:8624
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