Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a three?player divide the dollar Game

James Tremewan

No 1020, CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) from CEPREMAP

Abstract: This paper is an experimental study on the effect of group identity on the formation of coalitions and the resulting distribution of resources. After inducing group identity based on preferences over paintings, subjects play symmetric three-player _divide the dollar_ games with a majority rule decision process. The main finding is that where two players are from one group and one from the other, those in the minority earn significantly less than majority players. This is largely a result of a two-way split between majority players occurring more frequently, either because of the increased salience of this outcome, or a shift in social preferences.

Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2010-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:docweb:1020

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