The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China
Petra Persson and
Ekaterina Zhuravskaya ()
No 1503, CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) from CEPREMAP
Performance-based promotion schemes in administrative hierarchies have limitations. Chinese provincial leaders, despite facing strong career concerns, make different policy decisions depending on their career backgrounds. Provincial party secretaries who rose from low to high positions within the province they govern ("locals") spend a higher share of budgetary resources on education and health care and invest less in construction infrastructure than party secretaries who made their most significant career advancements in other provinces ("outsiders"). Identification comes from variation in central leadership and term limits. As the promotion mechanism rewards infrastructure investments, locals are less likely to be promoted at the end of the term. We explore various mechanisms and provide evidence that the difference between locals and outsiders is not driven by knowledge or experience. Several pieces of evidence suggest that locals cater to low-level provincial elites, who helped them rise to power. Thus, local career trajectories limit the power of career concerns by fostering competing allegiances.
Keywords: autocracy; career concerns; China; federalism; hierarchies; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 73 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-tra
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: THE LIMITS OF CAREER CONCERNS IN FEDERALISM: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA (2016)
Journal Article: The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China (2016)
Working Paper: The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:docweb:1503
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) from CEPREMAP Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mathieu Perona ().