The geography of collective bargaining in multi-establishment companies: a strategic choice of employers

Philippe Askenazy and Clémentine Cottineau

No 2205, CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) from CEPREMAP

Abstract: Despite the growing interest in the firm bargaining process, little research has focused on the structure of bargaining within a multi-establishment firm. This paper explores whether running negotiations at the very decentralized level of the workplaces and/or at a multi-establishment level is an employer's strategic choice to maximise profits, according to the characteristics of the firm. We propose a model where the level chosen for bargaining depends on the geography of the firm. The employer faces a trade-off: workplace level bargaining allows deals that meet local conditions; but a higher level increases the distance between workers and their representatives, weakening their bargaining power. Using a representative survey of French establishments merged with administrative sources, we test this model and find a significant relation between the level of bargaining within a firm and the spatial distribution of its facilities.

Keywords: collective bargaining; decentralization; geography of the firm; multi-establishment firms; wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpm:docweb:2205

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