Taxation and Conditional Cooperation

Bruno Frey and Benno Torgler

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: Why so many people pay their taxes, although fines and audit probability are low, has become a central question in the tax compliance literature. Concepts of Homo Economicus, endowed with a more refined motivation structure, help to shed light on the tax compliance puzzle. This paper provides empirical evidence for the relevance of conditional cooperation, using survey data from 30 European countries. The findings suggest that a higher perceived tax evasion leads to a lower tax morale, also when controlling for additional factors in a multivariate analysis.

Keywords: tax morale; tax compliance; tax evasion; pro-social behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 H26 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cfn and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cra:wpaper:2004-20

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