Parliaments as Condorcet Juries: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Representation of Majority Preferences

David Stadelmann, Reiner Eichenberger () and Marco Portmann

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: In parliament, individual representatives vote with a certain probability according to their constituents’ preferences. Thus, the mechanism of the Condorcet Jury Theorem can be fruitfully applied to parliamentary representation: The probability that a majority of representatives votes according to the preferences of the majority of their constituents increases with the number of representatives per district. The political economy literature has so far disregarded this aspect. We provide a theoretical discussion and quasi-experimental evidence for the validity of the Condorcet Jury Theorem in parliamentary representation by contrasting unique data from parliamentary roll call votes and popular referenda decisions.

Keywords: Condorcet Jury Theorem; Preference Aggregation; Voting Behavior; Legislature; Political Representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D78 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cra:wpaper:2011-14

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