Organizational Control Systems and Pay-for-Performance in the Public Service

Bruno Frey, Fabian Homberg and Margit Osterloh

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: Under certain conditions, output related performance measurement and pay-for-performance produce negative outcomes. We argue that in public service, these negative effects are stronger than in the private sector. We combine Behavioural Economics and Management Control Theory to determine under which conditions this is the case. We suggest as alternatives to the dominant output related pay-for-performance systems selection and socialization, exploratory use of output performance measures, and awards.

Keywords: organization control; organizational forms; public administration; organizations; public service motivation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cse, nep-hrm and nep-nps
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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