Income and policy choices: Evidence from parliamentary decisions and referenda

David Stadelmann, Marco Portmann and Reiner Eichenberger ()

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: We analyze political representation of preferences of different income groups by matching referendum outcomes for low, middle, and high-income voters with individual legislators' decisions on identical policy proposals. Results indicate that legislators more closely represent preferences of rich voters than preferences of middle-income and poor voters, and legislators are more responsive towards the rich. Preferences of low, middle, and high-income voters are, however, correlated. Representation of income groups varies according to legislators' party affiliations.

Keywords: Income; policy decisions; representation; voting; referenda; political behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Income and policy choices: Evidence from parliamentary decisions and referenda (2015)
Working Paper: Income and policy choices: Evidence from parliamentary decisions and referenda (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cra:wpaper:2014-19

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