How Lobbying Affects Representation: Results for Majority-Elected Politicians

David Stadelmann, Marco Portmann and Reiner Eichenberger ()

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: Combining referendum results with parliamentary votes of proportionally-elected politicians of the Swiss Lower House of Parliament, Giger and Klüver (American Journal of Political Science, forthcoming) find that sectional and cause interest groups affect the quality of political representation. We extend their analysis to a new dataset of majority-elected politicians of the Upper House. Our results show that sectional and cause groups do not affect defection of politicians from their constituents. This suggests that the electoral system moderates the influence of interest groups on political representation.

Keywords: Interest groups; representation; referenda; MP defection; electoral systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: How Lobbying Affects Representation: Results for Majority-Elected Politicians (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cra:wpaper:2015-15

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