Sollen CEOs rotieren?

Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: The institution of a single CEO (Chief Executive Officer) has significant weaknesses. The CEO's interests diverge from those of the owners and their representants as well as other top managers. Assigning so much power to a single person is risky. Changing a CEO incurs high costs. However, the traditional alter- native, a top management team working collectively, also has serious drawbacks. A new governance institution – a team of rotating chief executive officers – combines the advan- tages of the two traditional models without being fraught with their disadvantages.

Keywords: Governance; CEO; board of directors; supervisory board; management team; rotation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger and nep-isf
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Journal Article: Sollen CEOs rotieren? (2021)
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