Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games

Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps and Philippe Solal

No 2014-02, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: The axiom of Balanced collective contributions is introduced as a collective variant of the axiom of Balanced contributions proposed by Myerson (1980). It requires that the identical average impact of the withdrawal of any agent from a game on the remaining population. It turns out that Balanced collective contributions and the classical axiom of Efficiency characterize the equal allocation of non-separable costs, an allocation rule which is extensively used in cost allocation problems and in accounting. For instance, the equal allocation of non-separable costs coincides with the Nucleolus on the class of data sharing games within the European REACH legislation. While our result does not hold on data sharing games, we provide comparable characterizations of the equal allocation of non-separable costs and the Shapley value.

Keywords: Balanced collective contributions; Balanced contributions; Equal allocation of non-separable costs; Shapley value; Data games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 K32 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Balanced collective contributions, the equal allocation of non-separable costs and application to data sharing games (2014)
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