A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2015-03, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: A new class of allocation rules combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of allocation rules such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class of allocation rules, and one of each of its extreme points.

Keywords: TU-games; Solidarity; null player; Egalitarian Shapley value; Procedural values. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Class of Solidarity Allocation Rules for TU-games (2016)
Working Paper: A class of solidarity allocation rules for TU-games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-03

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