Nullified equal loss property and equal division values

Sylvain Ferrières ()

No 2016-06, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We provide characterizations of the equal division values and their convex mixtures, using a new axiom on a fixed player set based on player nullification which requires that if a player becomes null, then any two other players are equally affected. Two economic applications are also introduced concerning bargaining under risk and common-pool resource appropriation

Keywords: Player nullification; equal division; equal surplus division; bargaining under risk; common-pool resource (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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