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Sylvain Béal (), Mihai Manea, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2018-03, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We discuss several sets of cooperative games in which the Shapley value assigns zero payo s to all players. Each set spans the kernel of the Shapley value and leads to a different characterization of games with identical Shapley values. The special games we identify deliver intuitive axiomatizations of the Shapley value. We explain how each basis of the kernel of the Shapley value can be augmented to construct a basis of the space of all games.

Keywords: Shapley value; kernel; axiomatization; factious oligarchies; paper tigers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
Date: 2018-02
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